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The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process has 
impacted people and cities throughout the United States. 
Many municipalities are directly affected by base closures 
that occur within their borders. Of major concern to those 
cities and states is the economic impact a base closure will 
have on their local economies. In an effort to prevent bases 
from being closed many city and state officials and private 
citizens have turned to Federal officials for assistance. 
The Monterey Peninsula is one of the communities affected by 
the BRAC process, with the closure of Fort Ord and the 
recommended closure of the Defense Language Institute (DLI). 
The primary reason DLI was slated for closure by BRAC was 
excessive Base Operation Support (BASEOPS) Costs.  The City 
of Monterey adopted a unique alternative approach to prevent 
the closure of DLI. Monterey city officials developed a 
proposal to provide these costly BASEOPS services with the 
existing City infrastructure and presented it to the 
Department of Defense (DOD). This thesis will analyze this 
proposal, assess its feasibility and propose other 
contractual alternatives to reduce BASEOPS costs. The 
objective of the research is to present and evaluate 
possible alternatives for acquiring BASEOPS services and to 
recommend the most effective method to control BASEOPS 
costs. Perhaps this information can be used to prepare for 
future BRAC-type assessments of DLI to prevent its closure. 
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A.   BACKGROUND 
The initiation of the Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission (BRAC) process in the 1980 's signaled a change in 
the Army's overall basing strategy. Consolidation of 
activities with similar or supporting missions to reduce 
base support costs was the objective. The BRAC process has 
continued to close or reduce the operation of military bases 
both in and outside the Continental United States. It was 
not until 1990 that the BRAC commission brought the reality 
of a shrinking defense budget to Monterey, California, with 
its initial direction to close Fort Ord and then a 
subsequent change, allowing a small enclave to remain. These 
events signaled a possible end to the additional economic 
prosperity brought to Monterey and its surrounding 
communities by soldiers, sailors and their families. 
The recent closure of Fort Ord has left the Monterey 
Peninsula with only two small military installations: the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Defense Language 
Institute (DLI). It is necessary to understand that DLI is 
located, as a tenant command, on the Presidio of Monterey 
(POM) military installation. Although a reduced military 
infrastructure still exists at Fort Ord, its primary 
function is to support both the Naval Postgraduate School 
and Defense Language Institute. As currently staffed and 
organized, the Naval School is self-sufficient for base 
operations, personnel support and other necessary support 
functions. The Defense Language Institute, however, had been 
a tenant command of Fort Ord since its activation at the 
Presidio of Monterey in 1946 (Landis, 1993).  As Fort Ord 
began to disappear so did DLI's base operations support. It 
was incumbent upon the Army to develop new plans, programs 
and initiatives to continue the language school's mission. 
DLI currently receives its base operations support through 
several vehicles: Base Operations Support (BOS) contracts, 
interservice support agreements and the use of Army 
personnel (Landis, 1993). The cost of Base Operations 
Support (BASEOPS) services is estimated at approximately $12 
million (Cohn, 1993) which could be considered excessive for 
such a small installation. 
Consequently, during the past several years the 
Defense Language Institute has been a target for the BRAC. 
The high cost of living in the Monterey area, the excessive 
cost of base operations support and the lack of any major 
military installation to help reduce costs has made DLI a 
prime candidate for closure in 1995.  The threat of moving 
the school to the Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, 
Arizona, appeared to be the logical progression of events 
under the current basing policy. In 1995, as in past years, 
the city, state and federal representatives of the Monterey 
County area have mobilized to prevent DLI's closure. 
In 1993, as part of its endeavor to combat the closure 
of DLI, the City of Monterey petitioned the Department of 
Defense (DOD), under Section 2924 of Public Law (PL)101-510, 
Base Realignment and Closure Act. This section of the law 
required the Secretary of Defense to give special 
consideration and emphasis to any official statement from a 
unit of general local government adjacent to or within a 
military installation considered for closure or realignment. 
Subsequent to its 1993 request, the City had developed a 
proposal for the Department of the Army.  The proposal 
offered City resources and expertise to reduce BASEOPS costs 
at DLI, thus reducing the installation's appeal to the BRAC 
Commission.  The basic idea behind the proposal was well 
received by the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Installations and the Secretary of Defense (Conn, 
1994). However, after additional consideration the City 
decided to amend the proposal changing the basic premise of 
the agreement from a BASEOPS support contract to a real 
estate transaction. 
The first proposal, authored in 1993, offered a fixed- 
price contract to the Department of the Army, for the City 
to provide certain BASEOPS services at a cost of $2.6 
million (City of Monterey, 1993) . The assumption by the City 
was that this contract for $2.6 million coupled with a 
remaining cost of $5.8 million that the Army would pay to 
contractors per year, would reduce the overall cost of DLI 
BASEOPS from the estimated $12 million to roughly $8.4 
million. This contract, if accepted would provide the 
Department of the Army with an immediate savings of $4.6 
million. 
The second proposal, authored in 1994, introduced a new 
aspect to the City's idea of burden sharing to keep DLI in 
Monterey. In place of the initially planned fixed-price 
contract for BASEOPS a lease-lease back agreement was 
suggested. Under this plan the DOD would lease all the land 
that encompasses the Presidio of Monterey to the City. The 
land and buildings necessary to operate DLI would then be 
leased back to the Department of the Army at a cost of $2.6 
million. The City, as landlord, would then perform the same 
BASEOPS services listed in the initial fixed price contract 
as consideration for the lease. The lease-lease back 
agreement could be executed under the authority of 10 
United States Code (U.S.C.) 2667 (City of Monterey, 1994). 
Under this plan the City would make up the difference in 
lease price by leasing unused portions of the Presidio to 
other activities complementary to the DLI mission. One 
initiative may be led by a consortium of the Monterey 
Institute for International Studies and the California State 
University at Monterey Bay to provide language training for 
audiences not directly served by DLI. Any additional cost 
that cannot be recovered through additional leasing would be 
absorbed by the City. This type of arrangement would remove 
all contract oversight and audit requirements normally 
associated with Federal Government Contracting. 
B.   OBJECTIVES 
This thesis will focus on the lease-lease back proposal 
made by the City to keep the Defense Language Institute in 
Monterey.  It will examine the proposal in detail and make a 
recommendation as to its implementation, partial execution 
or rejection.  Additionally, the study will examine the BRAC 
process, why DLI is at risk of closure, the potential 
economic impact if DLI were closed, the political issues 
that have surfaced as a result of the Fort Ord closure and 
the unique aspects of the City of Monterey which may or may 
not assist in the DLI mission. The lease-lease back proposal 
is a Government reinvention initiative developed by the City 
of Monterey as a defensive strategy to counter the proposed 
relocation of DLI and any further negative economic impact. 
The BRAC process has significantly impacted the Monterey 
County area, and generated numerous studies on how dependent 
the American Economy has become on the defense 
infrastructure.  The proposal may become a Government 
reinvention model that could be utilized by other 
municipalities containing small installations, such as 
National Guard Armories or Arsenals. 
C.   THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this thesis is: "What 
does the City of Monterey's proposal offer to DOD in cost 
savings for operating and maintaining the Presidio of 
Monterey and the Defense Language Institute?"  The 
subsidiary research questions to be addressed are: 
1. What is the current DLI budget for BASEOPS? 
2. What are the current BASEOPS costs incurred 
at DLI? 
3. What are the unique qualities of the City of 
Monterey which may or may not assist in the 
DLI Mission? 
4. What economies of scale exist as a result of 
the proposal? 
5. What type of lease would be used if the City 
proposal is accepted? 
6. What would be the disposition of 
surplus/deficit revenues? 
7. What pricing strategy was used in developing 
the proposal? 
D.   SCOPE 
In order to provide a lucid and logical recommendation 
regarding the City of Monterey's proposal this study will 
examine several issues as they relate to the possible 
closure of DLL The review of BRAC Commission reports will 
provide background on how DLI came to be at risk for closure 
and the methodologies used to recommend DLI's disposition. 
Economic impact studies will also be utilized to assess the 
possible monetary impact on the Monterey County area should 
DLI close. The study will examine the specific environment 
the City of Monterey provides to DLI in accomplishing its 
mission of teaching foreign language and foreign area 
studies. A thorough review and price analysis of the 
proposal will be conducted to assess its suitability to 
Department of Defense needs. A cost comparison between the 
current DLI budget and the projected costs listed within the 
City's proposed cost estimate will be made to assess any 
real savings that can be attained via this initiative.  As 
there may be options other than the City's proposal, the 
study will provide several alternatives to the current 
initiative and compare these options to the current lease- 
lease back alternative.  Finally an examination of political 
issues that may affect the proposal will be identified 
because they have a direct impact on whether DLI will 
survive the BRAC process and whether the City's proposal 
will be approved or rejected. 
E.   LIMITATIONS 
Various obstacles were encountered that limit this 
study. These limiting factors are discussed in the following 
subsections: 
1. Data Classification 
The BRAC process is politically sensitive. Much of the 
most current data, although complete, were unavailable due 
to security classification or refusal by the agency involved 
to provide it for open research. The BRAC 95 report and 
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense were complete at 
the time of this study. Although the actual recommendations 
were published in numerous newspapers and periodicals, the 
detailed reports and raw data were not yet available as 
public information. 
2. Time line 
The BRAC process requires the Secretary of Defense, 
after reviewing the BRAC Commission recommendations, to make 
his own recommendations to the President of the United 
States. Once the Secretary's recommendations are approved by 
the President, the closure list becomes final. This time 
line may result in an actual decision to close or retain DLI 
and to accept or reject the City of Monterey proposal before 
this study is completed. 
3. Proprietary Information 
The City of Monterey's most current proposal was 
unavailable for the study due to the inclusion of 
proprietary information on actual costs currently charged 
within the City's Public Works Department. The City 
Government did provide the initial proposal for evaluation 
within this study. Additionally, release of the current 
proposal was restricted due to competition with another 
proposal submitted by municipalities near Fort Huachuca, 
Arizona. Since Fort Huachuca was the proposed site for 
relocating DLI, the City of Monterey was unwilling to risk 
releasing the data. 
F.   LITERARY REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
This research is not based on previous studies of the 
Monterey Proposal. Significant analyses have been completed 
on the effects of the Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission's decisions and actions. The work of the 
Commission is continuous, focusing on specific installations 
or geographic areas. Currently, there are few studies on the 
effects of DLI closure, because the Commission's major 
concern in the Monterey County area was the study of Fort 
Ord. Several of the reports used as secondary data within 
the study, address BRAC effects in a general sense and are 
not specifically linked to DLI or Fort Ord. DLI and its 
infrastructure have been included within BRAC reports as an 
afterthought, since its operating budget was significantly 
smaller than Fort Ord's. However, these studies provide a 
basis for assumptions and recommendations on the disposition 
of DLI. 
In addition to BRAC reports and recommendations, this 
study will also examine a significant amount of newly 
developed raw data, generated specifically on DLI and its 
possible closure. A large amount of the new raw data were 
developed from studies commissioned and funded by the City 
of Monterey. Logistics Management Institute(LMI)reports are 
also referenced. The data presented by LMI are a result of 
studies commissioned and funded by the Federal Government. 
Interviews were conducted with City of Monterey Officials 
and Federal Government Officials to further qualify the data 
presented. 
The BRAC process, though ostensibly focused on cost 
savings, is political, and as such the effects of political 
policies, current at the time of this study are directly 
pertinent to the problem and will also be reviewed. 
Their effect on possible outcomes of the DLI situation will 
also be addressed. 
G.   DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
BASEOPS: Base Operations Support 
BRAC: Base Realignment and Closure 
DOA: Department of the Army 
DEH: Directorate of Engineering and Housing 
DLI: Defense Language Institute 
DOC: Directorate of Contracting 
DOD: Department of Defense 
FORSCOM: Forces Command 
ISSA: Interservice Support Agreement 
NPS: Naval Postgraduate School 
POM: Presidio of Monterey 
TRADOC: Training and Doctrine Command 
H.   PREVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
A description of the chapters is provided below. 
Chapter II provides background on the BRAC method for 
evaluating bases for closure and a brief history of the BRAC 
process. It also provides an overview of the City of 
Monterey, the closure of Fort Ord and a description of the 
DLI mission and organization. Chapter III will discuss the 
economic impact on the Monterey County area due to the 
closure of Fort Ord and the anticipated additional impact 
should DLI be closed. Chapter IV presents the City of 
Monterey's Proposal. Chapter V analyzes the proposal, its 
pricing strategy and provides some possible alternatives to 
the City of Monterey's solution. It will also evaluate each 
alternative based on specific criteria using a standard 
decision matrix format. Chapter VI will state the 




The Army's Base Realignment and Closure process can be 
classified in four distinct rounds or stages. Each iteration 
builds upon its predecessor with the intent of molding an 
efficient, modern base structure that will support the 
proposed force structure as the Army transitions into the 
next century. The Army refers to these rounds as Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) I, II, III, and BRAC 91 (Dept 
Of the Army, 1991). The legal foundation for the BRAC 
process is found in PL 101-510, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 1991. Certain limitations that 
caused the BRAC process to be amended are found in 10 U.S.C. 
2687. To understand the plans being presented, it is 
necessary to review the history of the BRAC process, the 
current Army objectives for BRAC, the legislation that 
applies to the process and the methodology used by the 
Commission to determine base closures. 
A.   BRAC I 
BRAC I refers to the realignments and closures 
resulting from the 1988 Commission as codified in PL 100- 
52 6. The Commission's recommendations, as they affected the 
Army, required the closure of 7 6 installations (including 53 
stand-alone housing sites) and the realignment of 57 other 
Army installations to be completed by 30 September 1995. The 
Commission's recommendations were based on requirements as 
projected in 1988 and assumed that the force structure would 
retain the size and configuration outlined in currently 
approved plans (Dept of the Army, 1991). 
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Although that assumption has not proven to be the case, 
the Commission's recommendations implemented a streamlining 
of the installation structure utilized by the Military 
Services. The recommendations do not complicate subsequent 
realignments and closures because the Commission focused on 
the installations themselves and their utility and not on 
force structure. Their mission was to clean-up a decade long 
delay in realigning military installations whose usefulness 
could not be sustained. The Commission's recommendations 
essentially provided the Military Services a clean baseline 
from which to restructure the installation needs of what is 
forecasted to be dramatically altered troop levels (Dept of 
the Army, 1991). 
B.   BRAC II 
BRAC II refers to the Service Secretaries' proposals 
for additional realignments and closures as announced by 
Secretary of Defense Cheney on January 29, 1990. While BRAC 
I essentially rationalized the Military Services' 
installation structure to align it with known requirements 
in 1988, BRAC II reflected the Army's initial transition 
into a smaller force as reflected in the Army's FY 1991. 
budget submission. It needs to be emphasized that BRAC II 
did not reflect and was not intended to reflect the dramatic 
escalation in the pace of change in Eastern Europe which 
occurred following the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 
9, 1989. The FY 1991 budget and BRAC II were the mid-term 
transitions into the smaller force reflected in full scope 
in the FY 1992/1993 budget. BRAC II reflected a reduction of 
the Army's force from a 5-corps, 28-division force to a 4- 
corps, 23-division force. BRAC II also did not include any 
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Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) realignments 
or closures because of the uncertainties then associated 
with the ongoing Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty 
negotiations. As a transitional initiative, BRAC II proposed 
closure or layaway of 12 additional Army installations and 
recommended realignments which could have affected up to 134 
other Army activities. 
The Army is no longer pursuing implementation of six of 
the original BRAC II proposals. This is because PL 101-510, 
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991, 
restricted the Department's authority to continue those base 
realignment and closure proposals where the thresholds 
established by 10 U.S.C. 2687 are breached (Dept of the 
Army, 1991). 
For the next five years, the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990, a part of PL 101-510, is now the 
exclusive base closure and realignment process for any 
closure or realignment that would have triggered the 
provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2687. These new procedures halted 
the Army's studies associated with BRAC II proposals to 
close Fort Ord, California; Fort McClellan, Alabama; and the 
Sacramento Army Depot, California. Other studies 
discontinued included the BRAC II proposals to eliminate the 
Troop Support Command (TROSCOM), Missouri; realign the Red 
River Army Depot, Texas; and place Fort Gillem, Georgia, in 
a semi-active status (Dept of the Army, 1991). 
At the time that the BRAC II proposals were announced, 
Congress expressed concern that the proposed installation 
closures and realignments did not include OCONUS 
installations. OCONUS installations were not included in 
BRAC II because at that time CFE Treaty negotiations were 
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expected to cover European force structure. Subsequently, 
force structure was removed from the Treaty, which now only 
covers the reduction of certain types of military 
equipment(Dept of the Army, 1991). 
As a result, on September 18, 1990, Secretary Cheney an- 
nounced the draw down of forces at 150 overseas military 
sites, in 44 locations, in ten countries, ranging from small 
installations to major bases. For the Army, the announcement 
included closure or reduction at 113 Army facilities 
overseas (99 sites in Germany, 2 in Greece and 12 in Korea). 
These OCONUS announcements subsequently became known as BRAC 
III and follow-on OCONUS closures and realignments will 
continue with this terminology, e.g., BRAC III (round two), 
BRAC III (round three), etc (Dept of the Army, 1991). 
Just as BRAC II was the initial transition to a smaller 
force in CONUS, BRAC III was the initial transition to a 
smaller force overseas. Additional OCONUS closures, beyond 
the original September 1990 announcement, may occur to 
reflect the continued draw down of military forces overseas. 
C.   APPLICABLE LEGISLATION 
Public Law 101-510, the National Defense Authorization 
Act for FY 1991, established a new process for DOD Base 
Realignment and Closure actions which will govern all future 
DOD recommendations through the year 1995. Implementation of 
the first phase of this new process is called BRAC 91 (Dept 
of the Army, 1991). 
The new process applies to closures or realignments that 
trip the thresholds of 10 U.S.C. 2687. These thresholds are 
reached when the installation to be closed is authorized to 
employ at least 300 direct hire, permanent civilian 
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personnel, or where a proposed realignment of an 
installation that is authorized to employ at least 300 
civilians would be reduced by more than 1000, or by more 
than 50 percent (whichever is less) in the number of 
authorized civilian employees. The new Act directed the 
formation of an independent Defense Base Realignment and 
Closure Commission to review base realignment and closure 
recommendations made by DOD during the next five years. The 
Service's recommendations are to be based on a force 
structure plan submitted as part of the FY 1992/94/96 
budgets as well as selection criteria which must be 
published in the Federal Register, receive public comment 
and be submitted for Congressional review. The legislation 
requires the. Commission to convene only in calendar years 
1991, 1993 and 1995 (hence, the terminology of BRAC 91, BRAC 
93, BRAC 95) to assess and evaluate base realignment and 
closure recommendations from all Services and to forward its 
recommendations to the President and eventually to Congress 
for approval. The Commission will conduct public hearings on 
the DOD recommendations and may make revisions if the 
recommendations deviate from the submitted force structure 
plan and final criteria (Dept of the Army, 1991). 
The new legislation does not affect the execution of 
base closures mandated under PL 100-52 6 BRAC I, FY 1991 BRAC 
II proposals that do not exceed 10 U.S.C. 2687 thresholds, 
or BRAC III proposals which occur outside the continental 
United States (Dept of the Army, 1991). 
D.   THE ARMY'S OBJECTIVE FOR BRAC 91 
The Army's intent was to reduce and streamline its 
basing structure to reflect reductions in force structure 
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and management improvements, while ensuring the capability 
to expand should future threats require an increase in force 
structure. In order to meet those goals in the most 
efficient manner the Army decided to: 
- .Review all Army installations with respect to the 
needs of projected force structure. 
- Close unneeded installations and consolidate 
operations to  generate long term savings and 
operational efficiency. 
- Pursue Consolidation, realignment, and closure when 
it made military and economic sense to do so. 
- Attempt to minimize hardships on all involved (e.g. 
soldiers, families, civilian employees, and host 
communities) by pursuing ways to ease the difficulties 
that accompany closures and realignments (Dept of the 
Army, 1991). 
E.   BASING STRATEGY (ARMY) 
The foundation of the Army's basing strategy was to 
station units on high quality installations and match the 
best available installations to force requirements. However, 
the Army anticipated fewer installations in the inventory 
(Dept of the Army, 1991) . 
The number of small, single purpose installations must 
be reduced and those remaining would house organizations 
with highly specific missions. Installations which did not 
adequately support their current missions or had little 
potential to accommodate future missions were considered for 
closure or use by other activities. The Army actively sought 
to consolidate bases and functions in the face of decreasing 
resources, urban encroachment and a smaller force structure 
(Dept of the Army, 1991). 
The national strategy molded the Army into a smaller, 
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readily deployable force, primarily based in Continental 
United States (CONUS). Stationing wisely on quality 
installations would provide resources to train a combat 
ready force which could be generated, projected and 
sustained to support the national strategy. The BRAG 
process, and the Army's objectives for the process, made it 
clear that fewer bases would be needed. 
Events taking place throughout the world had caused 
fundamental changes in the nation's national strategy. 
Although the United States would retain global leadership 
responsibilities, the evolving national strategy dictated 
that the Army of the 90's be significantly different from 
that of the 80's. It must be smaller, principally based in 
CONUS and structured for flexible response to a variety of 
global contingencies. The Army's principal role, providing 
land power, would not change; however, the manner in which 
the Army generates, projects, and sustains forces would 
continue to evolve. The underlying principle was that 
strategy drove force structure, which in turn determined 
stationing. The Army's structure and its stationing vision 
must reflect the new realities of its evolving role. 
In some specific situations installations would be 
closed or realigned to reflect reductions in, or 
consolidations of, maintenance or training workload or 
consolidations and streamlining of support activities. To 
assist in making these tough decisions, however, the Army 
was guided by the following principles: 
-Maximize readiness with installations capable of 
generating, projecting and sustaining combat power in 
support of national military objectives. 
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- Consolidate into our best, most efficient facilities. 
- Maximize quality of life and minimize hardships for our 
soldiers, their families and civilian employees. 
- Provide for appropriate expandability and 
reversibility to ensure an installation base capable of 
responding to future force structure requirements. 
- Provide for adequate mobilization capability to train 
and mobilize as called for by various military 
contingencies. 
- Provide for adequate training land to sustain a trained 
and ready force. 
- Consider the costs and savings of proposed realignments 
and closures. 
- Consider the economic impact on communities. 
- Consider environmental impacts and restoration costs of 
proposed realignments and closures (Dept of the Army, 
1991) . 
F.   TRAINING OBJECTIVES 
The first objective is to train brigade level units at 
home station. Installations serving as home stations for 
maneuver units should have adequate area to support brigade 
size combined arms maneuver and live fire training. These 
installations should also possess sufficient real estate to 
allow rotation of land for environmental regeneration. 
Additionally, these installations require facilities to link 
commanders and staffs from battalion through corps for 
simulation to train the combined arms and service team (Dept 
of the Army, 1991) . 
The second objective addresses a major change in 
institutional training. Schools which provide training 
focused on branch organization should be reorganized 
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functionally into war fighting centers. For example, 
infantry and armor would be trained at a maneuver center, 
while the maneuver support center would be responsible for 
engineer, military police and chemical training. These 
installations should also possess sufficient area for 
maneuver and live fire training (Dept of the Army, 1991). 
The third objective addresses Combat Training Centers 
(CTCs). The Army will continue to provide at least two- 
separate CTCs in CONUS; one for light forces and one for 
heavy forces. These CTCs will be structured to support up to 
brigade level training. Brigades will rotate through the 
appropriate center on a schedule which provides a CTC 
experience for every maneuver brigade and battalion 
commander. To support the extensive training required at 
these centers, the Army must ensure adequate land available 
to allow for sufficient training and rotation for 
environmental regeneration (Dept of the Army, 1991). 
The final training objective addresses stationing and 
readiness as a function of force package. Each force package 
is organized with units from the active and reserve 
components. Units assigned to each package should be 
stationed in regional proximity to their controlling 
headquarters. This supports the requirement for each package 
to train extensively as a team in peace and during 
mobilization prior to deployment (Dept of the Army, 1991). 
G.   THE BRAC PROCESS (ARMY) 
The Army utilizes a three phased methodology in 
determining which installations would be recommended for 
closure or realignment to the BRAC Commission. A schematic 
representation is depicted in Figure 1. Phase I consisted of 
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determining a quantitative military value for each 
installation based on specific attributes developed by DOD 
as evaluation criteria. Phase II consisted of developing 
realignment/closure recommendations and alternative 
locations for the missions/personnel displaced by closing a 
base. Phase III encompassed the submission of a recommended 
list of base closures to the BRAC Commission, providing 
support, justification and any assistance necessary to 
explain the recommendations. 
Prior to initiating any individual installation 
evaluation, the Department of the Army developed seven 
categories to classify each installation. These categories 
were used to delineate the evaluation process and insure 
that installations were compared to other installations 
which had historically performed the same type of mission or 
performed similar functions. The seven categories were: 
-Fighting Installations 
-Training Installations 
-Command & Control Installations 
-Industrial Installations 
-Corps of Engineer Divisions/Districts 
-Reserve Component Installations 
-Other Installations (not evaluated for BRAC) 
For the purpose of this study we are only concerned with the 
first two categories: Fighting Installations (FT. Ord), and 
Training Installations (Presidio of Monterey/DLI). 
1.   Phase I (Military Value) 
Phase I consisted of the Army evaluating its 
installations in quantitative terms according to their 
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Figure 1. BRAC Evaluation Process 
relative military value. The purpose of this phase was to 
determine the military value of an installation as it 
related to other installations that had historically 
performed the same type of mission. This approach would also 
provide the value of an installation to the entire Army. 
Each installation within a specific category was measured by 
a set of specific criteria known as the measures of merit 
(Dept of the Army, 1991). These measures of merit are listed 
in Figure 2 and encompass the additional DOD developed 
criteria shown. These evaluation criteria are extremely 
broad and similar to those used by the 1988 BRAC Commission 
(Dept of the Army, 1991). To fully understand the assigned 
military value, each measure of merit must be adequately 
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defined. 
Mission Essentiality is defined as the ability to 
house, train and project forces. Mission Suitability is 
defined as how well the physical characteristics of the 
installation support the needs of the forces stationed 
there. Operational Efficiencies, however, were based on each 
type of installation and defined centrally by the major 
command (MACOM) having jurisdiction over the installation. 
For example, FORSCOM developed the operational efficiencies 
evaluation criteria for all fighting installations while 
TRADOC developed the criteria for training installations. 
Expandability was defined as the ability of the installation 
to expand as necessary. Finally, Quality of Life was defined 
as the ability of the installation to support the solider 
and his/her family (Dept of the Army, 1991). 
The measures of merit, defined above, were weighted 
based on the type of installation being evaluated and by the 
relative importance of the specific measure to that 
installation. For example, Expandability is a more important 
aspect of value to a fighting installation than it is to a 
training installation and was therefore given more weight 
when evaluating the fighting installation and less when 
evaluating a training installation. Generally speaking, the 
larger, more economical to operate, and modern installations 
were assessed more favorably. This quantitative appraisal of 
the specific installation values provided a starting point 
in the evaluation of the Army's base structure. It did not, 
however, create a "close this installation first" listing 
for the Army, but rather provided a logical basis for 
judging possible closure or realignment opportunities. 
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location, there were several installation unique 
considerations that could not be captured using the uniform 
assessment factors. Therefore these unique capabilities and 
functions were considered before any decision was made to 
close or realign an individual base. 
2.   Phase II (Develop Recommendation & Alternatives) 
Within Phase II of the evaluation, the Army completed 
four specific steps: The screening process, development of 
realignment and closure alternatives, impact assessment of 
the alternatives and refinement of alternatives. 
Upon initiation of Phase II some installations were 
omitted from further consideration for realignment or 
closure. A screening process consisting of five steps, was 
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developed to determine which installations should be studied 
further as BRAC candidates. Figure 3 shows a simplified 
diagram of that process (Dept of the Army, 1991). First, if 
an installation had a high military value it was removed 
from BRAC consideration. Second, the uniqueness of specific 
installations was considered. If the installation was the 
only one in the Army inventory capable of completing a vital 
mission or was of unique strategic value it was also omitted 
from further consideration. The third step in the screening 
process addressed direct and indirect force structure impact 
on installations. The only installations removed from 
further BRAC consideration were those not directly or 
indirectly affected by force structure changes (cuts). The 
fourth area screened was to determine whether enough data 
and analysis existed to make a recommendation or if further 
study was needed before recommending for or against closure 
or realignment. For example, some of the MACOM Commanders' 
vision for future operations required additional study to 
determine whether an installation would be able to fulfill 
future missions with minimal or no additional construction 
or BASEOPS support. Additionally, in many cases it was not 
cost effective for the Army to recommend simultaneous 
closure of all the bases under consideration. The final step 
of the screening process examined each installation's 
capacity by category. A capacity analysis was conducted as 
part of the screening process. The purpose of the capacity 
analysis was to match units and missions with specific 
installations and to determine whether excess capacity 






Figure 3. BRAC Screening Process 
After the Army installation inventory was screened, 
reasonable closure and realignment alternatives were 
identified. These alternatives were developed using the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Force Structure Plan, Military 
Value Analysis, installation capacity analysis and the Army. 
Vision of Operations in the Future (Dept of the Army, 1991). 
Upon identification of each candidate the Army assessed 
their viability by considering their return on investment 
(ROI), as well as the operational, economic and 
environmental impact. 
The Army used the Cost of Base Realignment Action 
(COBRA) model to assess the economic value/Return on 
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Investment of proposed BRAC actions. The COBRA model was 
developed by Logistics Management Institute (LMI) for use by 
the 1988 BRAC Commission. This model would estimate the 
costs related to major actions associated with the transfer 
of missions between bases. Additionally, the model can also 
estimate the cost of disposition of assets at closed 
installations. "It reports the cost in terms of key decision 
parameters which were used by the Army to review each 
alternative independently and as part of an entire package, 
to determine if the costs of closing an installation were 
justifiable in view of the expected return" (Dept of the 
Army, 1991,p.22). The model uses a standard six-year 
discriminator for the ROI time period and three important 
factors in comparing alternatives: the payback period, the 
break even period and the steady state savings. The payback 
period is defined as the amount of time between the 
completion of the realignment/closure action, and the point 
where the cumulative reduction in operating costs equaled 
the total implementation costs (Dept of the Army, 
1991,p.23). The break even period is defined as the amount 
of time between the beginning of the statutory six-year 
implementation period and the point where the cumulative 
reduction in operating costs equaled the total 
implementation costs (Dept of the Army, 1991,p.23). The 
steady state savings is defined as the recurring reduction 
in annual operating costs that occurs after all 
implementation costs have been taken into account (Dept of 
the Army, 1991,p.23). Given these three factors and the six- 
year time period it is of interest to note that the Army 
included the value of the land that could be disposed of at 
each closed installation within the ROI calculations. 
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However, when the estimated environmental restoration cost 
was higher than the value of the land, its value (land) was 
no longer included in the ROI calculations thus increasing 
the payback and break even periods. 
Economic impact was measured by DOD's Office of 
Economic Adjustment (OEA) which developed a model based on 
calculations and assumptions used by the 1988 BRAC 
Commission. The model was modified based on GAO 
recommendations and assessed both direct and indirect 
unemployment impact within communities surrounding closing 
or realigning bases (Dept of the Army, 1991). 
The environmental consequences were assessed for each 
alternative. The Army specifically considered the 
environmental impact of each realignment/closure proposal on 





-Hazardous material/waste cleanup 
-Land and air use 
-Programmed environmental cost/cost avoidance 
Finally, operational impacts were determined by the 
Army in assessing the degradation on readiness, mission 
effectiveness and management efficiency of the Army as a 
whole. 
As the final step of Phase II the Army deferred several 
installations from further BRAC consideration as the 
alternatives evaluated during Phases I and II provided poor 
return on investment and force structure uncertainties (Dept 
of the Army, 1991). The end result of the evaluation was a 
list of final recommendations to the BRAC Commission which 
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included the recommended closure of Fort Ord and a 
recommendation for further study on the Presidio of 
Monterey/DLI. A 1993 BRAC report, using the same 
methodology, recommended, "close the Presidio of Monterey 
(POM) and the Presidio of Monterey Annex, relocate the 
Defense Language Institute and contract foreign language 
training with a public university which must be able to 
provide this training at or near Fort Huachuca, Arizona," 
(Defense Base Realignment and Closure, 1993,p.1-10). 
H.   FORT ORD 
The history of Fort Ord dates back to 1917, when it was 
purchased by the Government as the Gigling Reservation. It 
was later expanded and redesignated Fort Ord. The 
installation is located five miles north of Monterey, 
California, and 120 miles southeast of San Francisco. The 
installation covers over seven and one half miles along 
California State Route 1 bordering the local communities of 
Marina, Seaside and Del Rey Oaks (Gatlin, 1992). 
Fort Ord encompasses approximately 28,500 acres of land 
that extend inland from Monterey Bay (Landis, 1993). Of the 
28,500 acres, 21,840 were used for maneuver and training 
areas. Support facilities account for approximately 18.5 
million square feet of the installation and some 78 percent 
of these are permanent structures (Gatlin, 1992). There are 
6,358 family housing units currently on the installation of 
which 508 are third party housing and support the Naval 
Postgraduate School. The employment structure, prior to 
closure, consisted of 14,359 military and 3,800 civilian job 
positions (Gatlin, 1992). 
Prior to its closure, Fort Ord was responsible for 
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training and support of several Army activities. The primary 
tenant of Fort Ord was the United States Army's Seventh 
Infantry Division (Light). The post also housed several non- 
divisional units, and the Silas B. Hays Army Hospital. Hays 
Army Hospital was a 450 bed full service medical center that 
provided health care for the surrounding military community, 
and area health care to fourteen surrounding counties of 
California (Gatlin, 1992). The hospital also supported 
health clinics located at the Presidio of Monterey, the 
Coast Guard Station of Monterey and Fort Hunter Liggett. 
Fort Ord was also the parent installation for the Presidio 
of Monterey, and Fort Hunter Liggett. Additionally, the post 
was designated as a processing and training center in the 
event of Presidentially authorized, major mobilization. 
The Presidio of Monterey, Fort Hunter Liggett and 
several Army Reserve Component installations depended on 
Fort Ord for administrative and logistic support. The 
Presidio drew upon Fort Ord's resources for post operations, 
maintenance and logistic support to sustain the students and 
faculty of the Defense Language Institute. The Naval 
Postgraduate School and the Coast Guard Station of Monterey 
received similar, support by way of an Interservice Support 
Agreement (ISA) (Closure Package, 1991). Fort Ord also 
supported the training and Army testing facility at Fort 
Hunter Liggett. 
In addition to supporting active duty Army activities, 
all active duty, retired and dependent military personnel 
were eligible to use many of the facilities at the post. 
These facilities included a post exchange, library, chapel, 
hospital and various morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) 
activities. Approximately 44,000 active duty personnel, from 
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five Military Services, and over 45,000 retirees frequented 
these facilities prior to the BRAC 91 decision to close the 
installation (Gatlin, 1991). 
At the completion of the BRAC 91 evaluation process, 
Fort Ord was rated as the 10th most important fighting 
installation out of 13 installations within the category. It 
is of interest to note that while Fort Ord was ranked 10th 
in a group of 13 bases, four of the bases within the 
fighting installation category were deferred from further 
consideration due to the screening process. Three of the 
four installations deferred were, Fort Richardson, Alaska, 
rated 11th and deferred due to force structure 
uncertainties; Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, rated 12th, 
deferred due to its strategic location and one of a kind 
capability to perform its mission; Fort Drum, New York, 
rated 13th deferred due to force structure uncertainties 
(Dept of the Army, 1991). The fourth deferment was Fort 
Polk, Louisiana; and although this installation was rated 
eighth out of 13 this meant that in reality only nine 
installations in the fighting category were evaluated for 
closure. The deferment of the aforementioned installations 
leaves Fort Ord as rated nineth out of nine installations 
assessed or dead last in the running to remain operational. 
As a result of the 1991 BRAC Commission evaluation 
subsequent recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, Fort 
Ord was closed and the United States Seventh Infantry 
Division (Light) was transferred to Fort Lewis, Washington. 
After further consideration of the impact Ord's closure 
would have on the remaining Monterey Peninsula installations 
a small enclave of family housing and services were allowed 
to remain in operation. 
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I.   DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE/PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY 
The Defense Language Institute was initially 
commissioned in 1941 and began its operations at Fort 
Snelling, Minnesota. The school was relocated to its current 
location at the Presidio of Monterey in 1946 and continues 
to operate on the Monterey Peninsula. DLI currently provides 
instruction in 21 different languages and foreign area 
studies. The school has an average annual enrollment of 
3,600 students from four of the Military Services (Landis, 
1991). 
DLI is organizationally assigned to the Army Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and receives all funding from 
that MACOM. Although DLI is a TRADOC sponsored activity the 
land it occupies, the Presidio of Monterey, is owned by 
Forces Command (FORSCOM). The POM includes approximately 390 
acres of land with an estimated 1.7 million square feet of 
permanent facilities for training, housing and office space 
(Landis, 1991). 
In the 1991 BRAC evaluation, the POM was classified as 
a training installation and subclassified as a professional 
school. It was rated third out of five installations 
evaluated for military value. However, the 1991 report 
deferred all professional schools from further BRAC 
consideration citing the increased cost of moving the 
activities and additional construction costs to provide 
additional field grade housing for faculty and staff 
supporting the DLI mission. 
J.   CITY OF MONTEREY 
Monterey is a quiet, well-managed coastal city of 
approximately 30,000, whose scenery and rich historic past 
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contribute to its reputation as a desirable convention site 
and vacation destination. 
A military presence has been notable from its founding 
by the Spanish in 17 69 up to the present time. Currently 
both the Army managed DLI located at the POM and the Naval 
Postgraduate School are sited in Monterey. In addition to 
those military installations, Monterey is also the site of 
the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey 
Peninsula College, Monterey College of Law and the newly 
established California State University at Monterey Bay. 
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III. ECONOMIC IMPACT 
A.   BACKGROUND 
Defense spending has become an integral part of our 
national economy. The military build up of the Reagan era 
(1981-1988) provided an economic boom to many industries and 
local municipalities. Military weapons contracts were in 
abundance, installations expanded due to increasing 
personnel strength, and communities adjacent to these 
activities were instantly injected with an additional flow 
of revenue, new jobs and a mistaken sense of financial 
security. With the initiation of the BRAC process in 1988 
the economic contribution of these military monies, to both 
industry and the public at large, began to evaporate. It is 
of interest to note that history provided a warning against 
developing this symbiotic relationship between defense 
spending and the national economy. 
During his farewell address to the American people, in 
January 1961, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower cautioned 
the nation:  "In the councils of government, we must guard 
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether 
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex" 
(STW, 1992).  Eisenhower was warning against the conjunction 
of interests and the great potential influence wielded by a 
large and continually growing military establishment working 
with a large arms industry.  Since Eisenhower's speech, the 
military-industrial complex has usually been discussed in 
terms of the deleterious effects defense spending has had on 
the U.S. economy (STW, 1992). 
The effect base closure and the absence of liberal 
defense spending will have on Monterey County has been 
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calculated by both the Government and the City with 
significantly differing results. 
B.   THE GOVERNMENT ESTIMATE 
The Logistics Management Institute (LMI) was contracted 
by the Government to assess the economic impact on all areas 
of the United States affected by BRAC Closures. LMI used 
three components to estimate that impact: payroll (Military, 
DOD Civilian and Reserve Component): prime contracts and 
local purchases by the installations in question. Given the 
components, LMI analyzed their role in the economy using the 
following methodology. 
1. Determination of Representative Areas 
To assess the impact BRAC Closures and reduced defense 
spending would have on local economies, it was necessary to 
analyze the nation according to regions known as 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA). The MSA designation 
was developed by the Census Bureau for metropolitan areas 
with a central city or urbanized area having a minimum 
population of 50,000 with a total population of 100,000. The 
purpose of the designation is to divide the United States 
into equivalent regions for study and accumulation of Census 
data.  This division would accommodate use of The Department 
of Commerce Regional Input-Output Modeling System II (RIMS • 
II). Several criteria were used to determine how the areas 
would be selected. Factors used to select the areas were 
population, type of DOD activity and geographical location. 
Table 1 illustrates the differentiation between MSAs. The 
City of Monterey is considered to be a Group 2 MSA County 
consisting of Monterey, Salinas and Seaside. 
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Group 1 Large MSA/County 650,000 (or more) 
Group 2 Large MSA/County 60,000-649,999 
Group 3 Non MSA 59,999 (or less) 
Table 1. Metropolitan Statistical Area (Population) 
2. Jobs and Earning Multipliers 
This section of the LMI methodology focuses on two 
effects of BRAC Closure: jobs and earnings. Jobs are 
classified in three separate categories: direct, indirect 
and induced. Direct jobs are those held by active duty 
military personnel, DOD Civilians and prime contract 
employees (LMI, 1993). Indirect jobs are those positions 
that produce goods or services directly input into an 
installation or prime contract (LMI, 1993). Induced jobs are 
defined as those positions created as a result of local 
spending by direct and indirect workers (LMI, 1993). 
To estimate the impact of job and earnings losses from a 
specific DOD Activity,  multipliers were developed using 
RIMS II. These multipliers are then applied to the actual 
direct job losses to estimate the number of indirect and 
induced jobs that will be lost within an MSA. The multiplier 
designated for the MSA County of Monterey, Salinas and 
Seaside was 0.50. 
3. Determination of Military and DOD Civilians 
It was necessary for LMI to estimate the number of 
military and DOD civilian personnel in each MSA. This task 
was quite difficult as there was no current DOD data base 
that allocated military payroll or personnel by MSA/county. 
Subsequently, LMI used two data sources outside DOD to 
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estimate military and DOD Civilian personnel at the 
MSA/county level: the DIOR Atlas/Data Abstract for the 
United States and the FORMIS-91 and 97 Reports. 
The DIOR Atlas/Abstract lists the number of active duty 
military personnel and civilians by state and location for 
the 10 largest DOD installations within each state. However, 
the county or MSA location was not identified in the 
abstract, and in states with more than 10 installations 
(California, Texas and Virginia) several installations were 
excluded from the report. FORMIS-91 and 97 provide data 
presented by installation for military and DOD civilian 
personnel for each Service. Again, the MSA subdivision or 
place of residence was not always identified by the report. 
The Monterey MSA was identified as employing 
approximately 19,000 direct military personnel and 6,000 DOD 
civilians in FY 91 (prior to Fort Ord Closure). 
4. Allocation of Military Payroll 
Data about combined military and DOD civilian payrolls 
at the MSA/county level are found in the Consolidated 
Federal Funds Report FY 91. These data are also provided in 
the DIOR Atlas/Abstract but it does not provide the data at 
the MSA/county level. The military payroll for each area was 
estimated by multiplying the number of military personnel 
residing in the area by the average military wage. The 
average military compensation for FY 91 was $22,800 per 
active duty person (LMI, 1993). Civilian payroll was 
determined by subtracting the active duty military payroll 
from the total DOD payroll outlay. The remainder was assumed 
to represent civilian pay and reserve component pay. The 
direct civilian payroll average for FY 91 was estimated at 
$30,000 per person (LMI, 1993). Therefore the total direct 
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loss of regional income if both Fort Ord and DLI were to 
close would be approximately $613 Million, using the LMI 
model. 
5. Estimating Impact of DOD Payroll 
To estimate the indirect and induced economic impact of 
the DOD payroll in each area multipliers for earnings were 
developed from the RIMS II model. These multipliers account 
for the Post Exchange, Commissary and other services 
available to military personnel on an installation. A 
downward adjustment was made to all military salaries based 
on these services. Army and Air Force salaries were only 
worth 77 percent of the amount originally estimated, while 
Navy salaries were only worth 73 percent of the amount 
originally estimated.  Civilian salaries, however, were 
worth 100 percent of the RIMS II value estimated due to the 
assumption that civilians do not consume any goods or 
services on base (LMI, 1993). Using the multipliers for each 
salary the adjusted amount of direct loss of regional income 
would now be $512 million. 
6. Installation Purchases 
Purchases made by installations within the MSA were 
computed by examining prime contract base purchases using 
the DD Form 350 Individual Contracting Action Reports and 
data from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report. The 
determination that certain contracts were linked to a 
specific installation was based on their Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. The total value of base purchases 
was compared with the total DOD payroll for the MSA. LMI 
found that local prime contracts average about 13 percent of 
total DOD payrolls for the MSA. Therefore it is estimated 
that an additional $66 million in installation purchases 
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would be lost by the closure of Fort Ord and DLL 
7. Total DOD Generated Employment/Earnings 
Total DOD generated employment for each MSA was 
computed as the sum of: direct military/civilian employment; 
indirect and induced employment from payroll spending; and 
direct, indirect and induced employment from installation 
spending. The Monterey MSA was identified in the LMI study 
as one of 31 MSAs with 20 percent or higher DOD related jobs 
as part of total MSA employment figures. 
The total DOD generated earnings was calculated from 
the sum of all DOD military/civilian payroll, additional 
earnings generated by DOD personnel outlays (e.g. interest 
on accounts, dividends paid, rents and transfer payments), 
purchases by the local installation and DOD procurement 
contracts in the MSA. Table 2 provides a summary of the 
total direct and indirect economic impact for the Monterey 
MSA due to the closure of Fort Ord and DLL It is necessary 
to note that the LMI study did not provide an average salary 
for the income lost due to the termination of indirect or 
induced jobs. 
8. Government Study Limitations 
The LMI study had several limitations that consistently 
underestimate the impact of base closure in the Monterey 
MSA. Assumptions and estimates for Non-Appropriated Funds 
(NAF) employees were omitted due to the lack of available 
data. Also, approximately $20.4 billion in prime contracts 
could not be allocated to any MSA within the study. NASA 
projects, Department of Energy contracts and classified 
procurement programs, (contracted through DOD) were also 
excluded from the estimate. The effect on the real estate 
market and property values was not assessed.  Finally, the 
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Category Jobs Earnings 
Direct Military 19000 $333 Million 
Direct Civilian 6000 $180 Million 
Indirect/Induced 12500 NA 
Additional Earning NA $  1.5 Million 
Installation Purchasing NA $ 66 Million 
Procurement Contracts NA NA 
TOTAL 37500 $579.5 Million 
Table 2. Government Estimated Economic Impact Monterey MSA 
study did not assess the normal cycle of each MSA individual 
economy. The general assumption was that each MSA was a 
production or industrial based economy that was capable of 
absorbing some of the workers displaced by base closure. 
C.   THE CITY ESTIMATE 
Over the past 50 years the composition of the Monterey 
region's economic base has become more diverse and stable 
due to increased Government spending and tourism (Kibby, 
1994). However, Monterey's economy has always been dependent 
on agriculture. Even today it still comprises over a third 
of the local economy. DOD employment represents a flow of 
steady income to the Monterey Region, stimulating local 
demand and the production of a variety of goods and 
services. Fort Ord had provided a stable source of regional 
income for almost 80 years (Kibby, 1994). The other military 
installations and activities on the Peninsula, such as DLI 
and NPS have increased the importance of military income 
within the local community. 
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The Monterey Regional economy continues to experience 
dramatic swings in activity and employment due to weather 
and growing conditions. The value of the military payroll as 
a steady source of income into the region is not fully 
considered by large economic models like RIMS II (Kibby, 
1994, p.64). 
The methodology used by the City to estimate the impact 
of base closure is similar to LMI. The results of their 
analysis are stated in terms of increased unemployment, 
direct and indirect job loss, impact on commercial and real 
estate markets and other intrinsic factors. However, we will 
compare the estimates using the LMI headings. 
1. Jobs and Earning Multipliers 
The job categories defined by LMI, direct, indirect and 
induced are not in dispute by the City, however the 
multipliers are in debate. Econometric and other simulation 
models suggest that the potential cumulative employment 
effect of the closure of Fort Ord and DLI would be greater 
(Kibby, 1994, p.66). Since the worker base within Monterey 
County is small, a change in employment increases the impact 
on the labor market (Kibby, 1994) . Several agencies in 
addition to the city conducted separate analyses to 
determine the multiplier used to determine indirect and 
induced job loss. Table 3 shows the estimated 
indirect/induced job loss due to DLI closure (Kibby, 
1994,p.72). The City subscribes to a multiplier of 0.67 for 
indirect/induced job loss. 
2. Determination of Military and DOD Civilians 
The City used data provided directly from the 
installations to determine the total number of military and 
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Agency Multiplier Total 
City of Montery 0.67 3550 
DOD-LMI (RIMS II) 0.5 2650 
Office of Governor 1.3 6900 
Table 3. Indirect Job Loss Estimate Comparison (DLI Only) 
civilian employees at Fort Ord and DLI. Although the data 
provided nearly exact numbers the total was rounded to the 
nearest hundred for computational purposes. Fort Ord 
employed approximatly 20,700 civilian and military personnel 
while DLI employs approximatly 5,300. Given the multipliers 
listed in Table 4 the total direct and indirect job loss 
from DLI closure could range from 7,950 to 12,200 jobs. 
3. Allocation of Military Payroll 
The City assumed, in allocating the effect of lost 
payroll, that the median salary for the student load at DLI 
was $34,000. This salary level is the DOD certified average 
cost used in the COBRA model for Government estimates 
(Kibby, 1994). Given this salary level the approximate loss 
to the economy is $112 million. However, since many of the 
DLI students are entry level soldiers the estimated income 
was reduced to $40 million (Kibby, 1994). In addition to the 
student load, DLI employs approximately 375 military 
personnel as instructors and support staff, which are 
predominantly married and live off post. The total estimated 
payroll of the DLI staff is $14 million (Kibby, 1994). 
Approximately 1,200 civilans are employed at DLI as 
instructors and support staff. The assumption was made that 
all DLI civilians make the median household income of 
Montery County, $34,200. The additional impact of losing 
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civilian salaries is estimated at $40 million. There are 
also approximately 450 civilian support staff positions not 
associated with DLI which are primarily used for BASEOPS 
support at the POM Annex (Fort Ord), adding another $15 
million in direct salaries. The total military and civilian 
payroll attributable to DLI is roughly $110 million. 
4. Estimating Impact of DOD Payroll 
The only adjustment of payroll was in assessing student 
payroll from the computed $112 million to $40 million. This 
was due to the majority of DLI students achieving only 
initial entry ranks prior to attendance. All other DOD 
payroll was assessed without downward adjustment. 
5. Installation Purchases 
As DLI has not awarded any prime procurement contracts, 
installation purchases were limited to supplies and services 
purchased locally. DLI spends approximately $9.9 million on 
installation purchases (Kibby, 1994). 
6. Total DOD Generated Employment/Earnings. 
The Monterey Region economic base employment peaked in 
1988-89, the end of the Reagan era (Kibby, 1994). It is 
estimated that 25 percent of all current and future 
unemployment in Monterey will be the result of Fort Ord's 
closure and the proposed closure of DLI (Kibby, 1994) . 
Unemployment for the Monterey County region rose from eight 
percent to 19 percent after the closure of Fort Ord. The 
City estimates that the closure of DLI would raise 
unemployment another six percent (Kibby, 1994). This relates 
to a 25 percent jobless rate just by adding the numbers. 
However there are othe impacts to the area in addition to 
direct job loss. As military personnel are now using 
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civilian health care, due to the closure of Silas B. Hays 
Army Community Hospital, those lost revenues must be 
considered. The estimated lost revenue for military health 
care is approximately $5.8 million. This assumes that the 
CHAMPUS payments approximate national average payments, at 
$1500 per person (Kibby, 1994). Rental payments and real 
estate market effects must also be considered as economic 
loss should DLI close. Currently, at least 500 military 
personnel from DLI rent housing at an average monthly cost 
of $800. This contributes an additional $4.8 million into 
the regional economy. The real estate market will be 
affected should DLI close. For example, the home market in 
the Monterey MSA has changed dramatically since the closure 
of Fort Ord. Prices of homes dropped 10 percent in the 18 
months following the announcement of the installation's 
closure (Kibby, 1994). The real estate consulting firm of 
Sedway & Associates estimated in 1992 that vacancy rates for 
rental housing could grow from 3.7 percent to an excess of 
30 percent in Marina and Seaside. These vacancy rates put 
financial pressure on the owner and can cause a high rate of 
foreclosure or mortgage defaults. The result will be 
increased Federal expenditures by the Veterans 
Administration, FHA and HUD. Additionally the City itself 
will be impacted by reduced revenues. The closure of DLI 
could further reduce the City's population by 15 percent 
(Kibby, 1994). Municipal revenue is driven by sales taxes 
and transient occupancy taxes. Fort Ord's closure reduced 
the budgets of the Cities of Marina and Seaside by 10-15 
percent. It is also estimated that DLI closure in addition 
to Fort Ord will cause the Monterey Unified School District 
to lose $22.5 million annually and force a layoff of 600 
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teachers and staff. The actual financial loss due to many of 
these impacts is difficult to estimate. 
The total DOD generated employment was computed in the 
same manner as the LMI study as the sum of: all DOD 
military/civilian payroll, additional earnings generated by 
DOD personnel outlays (e.g. interest on accounts, dividends 
paid, rents and transfer payments), purchases by the local 
installation and DOD procurement contracts in the MSA. In 
addition health care loss, rental loss and unemployment 
compensation were added to the City estimate. Table 4 
Category Gross Adjusted 
Civilian Income $ 71.5 million $71.5 million 
Military Staff $ 14.6 million $14.6 million 
Enlisted Students $112 million $57.5 million 
Health Care $  5.8 million $  5.8 million 
Rental Loss $  4.8 million $  4.8 million 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
$ 11.0 million $ 11.0 million 
Local Purchases $  9.9 million $  9.9 million 
Total $232.9 million $169.7 million 
Table 4. Direct Economic Impact of DLI Closure 
provides direct economic impact of DLI closure (Kibby, 1994, 
p.69). Table 5 provides the commulative regional impact of 
the closures of both DLI and Fort Ord (Kibby, 1994). 
7. City Study Limitations 
The City study had two distinct limitations. First the 
use of the Monterey County Median Household income for 
civilian salary. As the data on civilian employment were 
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Category Jobs Earnings 
Direct Job loss 26000 $535 million 
Indirect/Induced Loss 15800 $295 million 
Installation Purchases NA $ 75.9 million 
Procurement Contracts NA NA 
Additional Earning NA $3.1 million 
Total 41800 $909 million 
Table 5. Cumulative Regional Impact of Fort Ord & DLI 
Closures 
gained from the installations General Service grade and step 
level could have been used to better estimate the average 
civilian salary. Second, in downgrading the enlisted student 
salaries for the DLI student load the City cited no specific 
methodology in arriving at the $40 million figure. 
D.   SUMMARY 
The economic impact studies for both the Government and 
the City predict a turbulent future for the Monterey County 
Area. The actual economic loss the Monterey MSA could expect 
to experience is somewhere between the Government estimate 
of $580 million and the City estimate of $909 million. The 
projected loss of this revenue compelled the City to respond 
with an alternate solution to the closure of DLI. 
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IV. THE CITY PROPOSAL 
A.   BACKGROUND 
1. Specific Legislation 
On May 7, 1993 the City of Monterey made it clear to 
DOD that they were ready to assume certain burden sharing 
costs to insure the continued operation of DLI and possibly 
NPS in Monterey. The City hoped this would prevent the 
relocation of DLI to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and contracting 
of DLI training with the University of Arizona. The City and 
its officers submitted a proposal, whereby the City of 
Monterey would assume certain BASEOPS functions under a 
Fixed-Price contract. The proposal was later adjusted from a 
contracting action to a real estate action. In the updated 
proposal the City would lease all land from DOD that 
encompassed the POM and then lease back to DOD all land and 
facilities necessary to operate DLI. As consideration for 
the lease agreement, the City as landlord, would provide the 
same BASEOPS functions at no cost. The cost to DOD to lease 
back all land and facilities necessary to operate DLI would 
be the aggregate cost of the BASEOPS provided by the City. 
This new proposal would be known as the lease-lease 
back initiative and can be accomplished under 10 U.S.C. 
Section 2667, Leases: non-excess property. The law requires 
Secretary of the Army approval to lease the land and 
provides specific guidelines as to when a lease may be 
authorized, the length of the lease and how the monies 
received from the lease are to be distributed. The Secretary 
of any Military Department has the authority to lease land 
when he/she: 
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...considers it advantageous  to the  United States, he 
may lease  to such lessee and upon such  terms as he 
considers  will promote  the national  defense  or be in 
the public interest,   real   or personal property that  is 
under  the  control   of the department,  not needed for 
public use or that is not  classified as excess property 
(10 U.S.C. 2667, (a)). 
The duration of the lease, as specified in Subsection B, may 
not be longer than five years. However, should the Secretary 
determine that a longer lease will promote national defense 
or be in the public interest, the lease may be for longer 
periods. Except for lands that are leased for agriculture 
and grazing, all monies received from the lease shall be 
credited into the United States Treasury as miscellaneous 
receipts. However, any payments for utilities or services 
furnished to the lessee by the Department concerned may be 
credited to the Department. 
The Mayor of Monterey validated submission of the 
proposals via Section 2924 of Public Law 101-510, Community 
Preference Consideration in Closure and Realignment of 
Military Installations, which states: 
In any process  of selecting any military installation 
inside  the  United States for closure or realignment, 
the Secretary of Defense shall  take such steps as are 
necessary to assure special  consideration and emphasis 
is  given  to any official  statement from a  unit  of 
general  local  government  adjacent  to  or within  a 
military installation requesting the closure  or 
realignment  of such installation.... 
The intent of the City Council of Monterey is to use this 
proposal to keep DLI, and its economic contribution, located 
in Monterey. However, it is noted that in minutes of a City 
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Council meeting a detailed statement of intent was issued; 
"...This proposal will provide no profit to the City nor 
will it undermine the existing city infrastructure to our 
detriment..." 
2. Unsolicited Proposal (Qualification) 
Essentially, local government officials provided an 
unsolicited proposal to the DOD with the City of Monterey, a 
municipality, as prime offeror. Transactions such as these 
are governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
which provides all government officials with the guidelines 
and laws for all forms of acquisition, purchasing and 
contracting. The unsolicited proposal is defined in the FAR 
Subpart 15.501 as: 
...a written proposal   that is submitted to an agency on 
the initiative of the  submitter for  the purpose  of 
obtaining a  contract  with  the Government  and which is 
not in response  to a formal  or informal  request. 
The unsolicited proposal provides the Federal 
Government with a valuable means of obtaining innovative 
approaches to mission completion from sources or individuals 
outside the Government. However, FAR Subpart 15.503 states 
that a valid unsolicited proposal must be, innovative and 
unique, independently originated and developed by the 
offeror, prepared without Government supervision and provide 
sufficient detail to permit a determination that Government 
support could be worthwhile and benefiting to the agency 
mission. Additionally, an advance proposal for a known 
agency requirement is not considered to be unsolicited. 
The general policy regarding the unsolicited proposal 
is, that agencies may accept such proposals provided it is 
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done in accordance with FAR 15.507. Should an agency receive 
an unsolicited proposal that is not related to their mission 
or needs, that agency may identify, to the offeror, other 
agencies whose missions are related to the proposed subject 
matter. Additionally, FAR 15.504 suggests that potential 
offerors make preliminary contacts with the appropriate 
agency personnel prior to expending funds or manpower in 
preparing a detailed unsolicited proposal. The preliminary 
contacts should include inquiries as to the need for the 
type of effort considered and inquiries to fully understand 
the agency mission. In contrast to the offeror's initial 
contact, the agency is required to make certain general 
information available to the offeror of an unsolicited 
proposal. The information must be written and include the 
definition of an unsolicited proposal, the requirements for 
responsible prospective contractors, agency points of 
contact, procedures for submission and evaluation of the 
unsolicited proposals, instructions on identification and 
marking of proprietary data and information sources on 
agency objectives and potential interests. 
The content of the unsolicited proposal is less 
extensive than the normal proposal simply because there are 
no specifications or evaluation criteria to address from the 
RFP. The unsolicited proposal should include the basic 
contractor identification data, an area that discusses 
technical information and an area that provides the required 
supporting information. Of the three areas the technical 
data is the most important and provides the purpose of the 
proposal. FAR 15.505 states that the technical section 
should include, a concise title and abstract of the project, 
a discussion of objectives, methods and expected results of 
50 
the project, names and biographical information of key 
personnel and the type of support needed from the 
Government. 
Given the minimal requirements for an unsolicited 
proposal to be considered it is of interest to note the 
prohibitions imposed on Government employees who deal with 
this type of proposal. FAR 15.508 directs Government 
personnel not to use any data, concept or idea from an 
unsolicited proposal as the basis for a new solicitation, or 
in negotiations with another firm unless the offeror is 
contacted and agrees to the intended use. Additionally, 
Government personnel are also restricted from disclosing 
restrictively marked proprietary data, listed in an 
unsolicited proposal. 
The City proposal qualifies as unsolicited given the 
requirements of the FAR. However, the legislative 
requirements of PL 105-510 and FAR Part 15 only compel 
Government officials to read and review the proposal. Once 
reviewed the proposal does not have to be formally 
evaluated, accepted or rejected. 
B.   PROPOSAL 
1. BASEOPS Functions 
The list of base operations services conducted at DLI 
is extensive and diverse. Although the City of Monterey 
proposes to assume responsibility for a significant amount 
of these services many specific services will remain under 
Department of the Army control. The City proposes to furnish 
the following BASEOPS functions as part of the proposal: 
Facility Maintenance, Utility Operations, Engineering 
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Services and Fire and Police Services. Within each of these 
areas the City intends to provide labor, supervision, 
administration, management, supplies, materials and 
equipment. The work to be performed specifically by the city 
would be:(Cohn, 1993). 
Repair and maintenance of buildings and structures 
Repair and maintenance of paved roads and surfaces 
Operation repair and maintenance of the following 
utility systems: 
-Potable Water System 
-Natural Gas Distribution 
-Electrical Distribution 
-Sanitary Sewer Collection 
-Maintenance of improved and unimproved grounds 
-Engineering, planning, programming and inspection 
of: 
MCA Projects 
MCA - Minor Projects 
Engineering Support (day to day work) 
-Fire prevention and suppression 
-Law enforcement 
-Administration of Contracts for purchased 
utilities if desired 
f-it-w Ar»<-i^n I 
Maintenance 
r^vornmoni-    Ar^irm 
Purchase Utilities 
Buildings & Roads Water, Gas, Electric 
Improved/Unimproved Grounds Sewer 
Operations & Maintenance Purchase Services 
Potable Water & Gas Dist. Refuse Collection 
Sanitary Sewer Dist, Telephone & Laundry 
Electrical Dist, Child Care & Food Service 
Engineering Personnel Support 
Engineering Review/MCA Proj Contracting 
Fire Prevention/Suppression Records Management 
Law Enforcement MWR 
Contract Administration 
Table 6. Comparison of BASEOPS Responsibilities 
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Given this menu of services the Army would be responsible 
for the following services which include purchasing of all 
utilities, phone service, transportation, laundry, food 
service, personnel support, child care, MWR, Contracting, 
and records management. The cost to the Army for the 
remaining services could be further reduced through 
consolidation and interservice agreements with the Naval 
Postgraduate School. Table 6, compares the BASEOPS 
responsibilities between the Government and the City. 
2. Costs 
The City of Monterey asserts that land containing the 
Presidio (e.g. 1.9 million cubic yards) can be assimilated 
into the existing city support structure and maintained with 
only minor additions to the City's equipment pool. The minor 
additions are estimated to cost the City and/or the 
Government $457,100 initially for capitalization in addition 
to the lease cost. 
The current operating budget for the Defense Language 
Institute is $9.2 Million for all support services. However, 
the City of Monterey actually estimates the cost of these 
services at $8.3 Million. A cost comparison of Base 
Operating Services (BASEOPS) is contained in Table 7. Once 
the lease agreement is completed, the City will lease back, 
at a cost of $2.6 million, the land and buildings necessary, 
to operate DLI, to the DOD. This assumes that the Government 
will continue to pay for utilities and other BASEOPS 
services at a cost of $5.7 million. This arrangement would 
in theory save the Government approximately $3.5 million per 
year. This arrangement becomes a land transfer action, 
between lessee and lessor, rather than a procurement action 
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Army Est. City Est. 
Utilities 1,797,907 1,797,907 
RPMA 
BOQ 111,128 incl. 
Family Housing 274,182 incl. 
Other 1,037,371 incl. 
Sub Total 1,422,681 1,521,827 
Engineering SPT 
Fire Dept 364,000 366,428 
Refuse incl. 223,731 
Engineering incl. 213,631 
Project MGT incl. 80,261 
Work MGT incl. 53,611 
Environmental incl. 32,566 
Quality Control incl. 51,552 
Other 1,238,015 38,702 
Sub Total 1,602,015 1,060,482 
Other Accounts 
Police 226,285 134,713 
Custodial 393,168 393,168 
Building Sup 236,786 236,786 
Maintenance 351,466 93,048 
Transportation 221,840 221,840 
Laundry 42,850 42,850 
Food Service 2,100,300 2,100,300 
Personnel SPT 209,528 188,575 
Child Care 140,485 140,485 
Telephone Sys 84,255 84,255 
MWR 130,949 130,949 
Resources MGT 178,864 160,978 
Contracting 75,888 45,533 
Records MGT 17,585 17,585 
Sub Total 4,410,249 3,991,065 
Total 9,232,852 8,371,281 
Delta 861,571 
City Cap. Cost 457,100 





Table 7 BASEOPS Cost Comparison 
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and as such may not be subject to certain regulations or 
restrictions of normal contract activities. The City intends 
to make up the difference in lease price by leasing unused 
portions of the Presidio to other activities complementary 
to the DLI mission. One initiative may be led by a - 
consortium of the Monterey Institute for International 
Studies and California State University at Monterey Bay to 
provide language training for audiences not directly served 
by DLI. Any additional cost that cannot be recovered through 
additional leasing would be absorbed by the City. 
The lease-lease back arrangement has several advantages 
for the City as well as DOD. First it saves considerable 
BASEOPS expense while maintaining mission capability. The 
agreement allows DOD to maintain long term ownership of DLI 
assets and lands. The City can focus specific manpower 
spaces on DOD unique functions. It allows DOD to maintain 
its contingency capacities in case of mobilization. Finally, 
this proposal may create a management model for other small 
installations located within municipalities. 
3. Pricing 
In pricing the cost of the specific BASEOPS services 
the City used its own historical costs and completed an 
incremental analysis of those costs. The historical costs 
used were as recent as one year but no older than two years. 
The historical costs were for the same types of jobs and 
services that would be provided to DLI should the proposal 
be approved. In analyzing costs the following steps were 
taken. All costs associated with providing services to DLI 
were totaled. Once the total cost was tabulated fixed costs 
were dropped. With this method the City of Monterey assumes 
responsibility for all fixed costs, charging the Government 
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City Cost 
Position Hourly Rate Burden Adj Rate Yearly Cost 
Associate Civil Eng 28.26 34% 37.87 78,770 
Junior Civil Eng 19.93 34% 26.71 55,557 
Eng Technician 16.79 34% 22.50 46,800 
Subtotal 181,127 
Supplies Draft Engr Supplies 21,735 
Equipment Computers, 2 each 6,667 
Mini Pickup 1 each 3,552 
fireproof file 250 
Total City Cost £ J. %J / «J Jx 
Govt Cost 
Position Hourly Rate Burden Adj Rate Yearly cost 
Associate Civil Eng 28.26 0% 28.26 58,780 
Junior Civil Eng 19.93 0% 19.93 41,455 






City Cost 213,331 
Govt Cost 135,160 
Cost Absorbed by City 78,171 
Table 8. Pricing Strategy Example 
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(DOD) only those variable and material costs necessary to 
provide BASEOPS. Once rates were computed they were applied 
to current historical hourly usage rates at DLI for all 
services that would be provided by the City.  A standard 
example of this strategy is listed in Table 8 (Cohn, 1993). 
4. Limitations 
The City proposal has several limitations that must be 
addressed prior to its acceptance or actual implementation. 
First, what type of lease would be used by the DOD to lease 
the land to the City of Monterey? Second, what type of lease 
can the City use to lease back the land to DOD? Third, costs 
for construction of new facilities are mentioned in the 
proposal but not specifically assigned to the City or DOD. 
Fourth, the City will require anywhere from 10-30 additional 
employees to implement the proposal. The Assistant City 
Manager believes that hiring the displaced employees from 
Fort Ord or DLI would be candidates for these jobs. The 
question of seniority and pension benefits and the transfer 
of these benefits from the Federal Government to the City 
are in question. Additionally, accident liability and 
disaster liability are also in question; who pays for 
insurance, who will cover costs of repair, the City or DOD? 
There are also a myriad of other smaller issues that must be 
negotiated should the proposal be accepted by the DOD. 
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C.   ADDITIONAL ESTIMATED SAVINGS 
In addition to the estimated savings in BASEOPS 
functions, the City asserts that certain one time costs 
would be saved by accepting the proposal. These one time 
costs can be classified as closure costs and construction 
costs. 
Closure costs are those expenditures that must be 
disbursed in order to properly close an installation. The 
closure costs the City focuses on are Reduction In Force 
(RIF) cost, moving costs, unemployment compensation, and 
administrative support to accomplish the closure. Table 9 
provides what the Army estimates it will cost in these four 
areas should DLI close. The City has estimated the real cost 
of these activities (Cohn, 1994). Real cost is defined as 
the measure of a price or income which is corrected for 
inflation factors over a period of time as to assess the 
actual purchasing power (Friedman, 1987). 
Item Army Estimate Real Cost Estimate 
RIF Cost $1.6 million $13.12 million 
Moving Cost $7.8 million $15.7 million 
Unemployment Comp. $1.05 million $8.14 million 
Admin. Support $0.13 million $12.76 million 
TOTAL $10.68 million $49.72 million 
Table 9. Summary of Estimated One Time Closure Costs 
The one time construction costs are those expenses 
which are disbursed to provide the facilities necessary to 
support the DLI mission at another location, in this case 
Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Table 10 provides a summary of these 
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categories, the Army estimated cost and the City estimated 
real cost (Cohn, 1994). 
Item Army Estimate Real Cost Estimate 
Classroom $0 $97.01 million 
Academic Spt Bldg. $0 $4.15 million 
Warehousing $1.93 million $3.85 million 
Family Housing $36.68 million $152.80 million 
Company HQ $4.63 million $6.48 million 
Child Care Center $2.31 million $3.80 million 
Other Troop Spt. $6.20 million $8.75 million 
TOTAL $51.75 million $276.84 million 
Table 10. Summary of Estimated One Time Construction Cost 
If DLI is closed and moved to another location the 
long-term real cost to move the personnel and reestablish 
the  facilities is estimated at $327 million. A decision to 
retain DLI in its current location or to accept the City 
proposal would save approximately $327-$330 million in 
defense spending. 
D.   POLITICS 
The politics of base closure is a difficult puzzle to 
assemble. In the past seven years several major 
installations have been slated for closure. However, 26 of 
these are still in operation. The DOD has transferred 
offices and new functions to these bases in order to keep 
them operational. Additional studies have been conducted by 
DOD and results forwarded to the BRAC Commission to solicit 
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their approval to keep the installations open. Currently 
bases that are slated to close receive little scrutiny after 
the decision to close is made (Schimtt, 1994). This is due 
to loopholes in the BRAC laws and lobbying by communities 
close to the installation in question. In 1991 the BRAC 
commission received over 30 letters and proposals from 
municipalities adjacent to closure installations requesting 
further study. These letters were endorsed by local and 
Federal politicians. 
The BRAC process itself is a political one. The 
Commission is made up of seven appointed members. Of these 
seven, three are appointed by the President of the United 
States, two by the Senate Majority Leader and two by the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives (Akeman, 1994). 
Recent Congressional elections have placed additional focus 
on the BRAC process as many Senators and Representatives 
from the Democratic Party were displaced by newly elected 
Republican Party members (Akeman, 1994). The Honorable Sam 
Farr (D), House of Representatives, warned the Monterey 
Community that these election results pose new threats to 
DLI and its continued operation on the Peninsula (Akeman, 
1994). This threat comes from newly elected Republicans in 
Arizona who would increase pressure to move DLI to Fort 
Huachuca, Arizona. In response to this threat Farr has 
introduced and supports new legislation that would allow 
military installations to negotiate directly with cities. 
The City of Monterey Lease-Lease Back initiative is a model 
for this type of negotiation (Hammond, 1995) . 
To counter political influence and level the playing 
field of the BRAC process, many communities have begun their 
own lobbying campaigns. The City Council of Monterey has 
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approved over $400,000 for consultants, studies and numerous 
trips to Washington, D.C., for Mayor Dan Albert, City- 
Manager Fred Meurer and Assistant City Manger Fred Conn 
(Hammond, 1995). The California Governor's Office has 
established the position of Director of Military Base 
Retention. This state official works with local communities 
to develop action plans and assists in lobbying (Official, 
1994). However, California is not the only state to become 
involved in base retention. The City of Sierra Vista, 
Arizona, which is adjacent to Fort Huachuca, has also 
earmarked $15,000 for lobbying and consultants (Howe, 1994). 
The Sierra Vista Economic Development Foundation has taken 
the lead in developing its own action plans, lobbying 
techniques and obtaining consultants to solicit the movement 
of DLI (Howe, 1994). The States of Texas and Utah have 
similar organizations also attempting to influence the DLI 
decision (Akeman, 1994). In essence the DLI situation has 
become a small bidding war between communities who have 
positively assessed the economic value of the installation. 
In addition there are many reuse groups, citizens 
groups, individuals and other organizations, that attempt to 
change or prevent BRAC decisions from becoming reality. One 
example is the Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA). This 
organization has fully and publicly endorsed the Monterey 
Lease-Lease Back initiative. Since FORA has direct 
jurisdiction over how land at the Presidio of Monterey Annex 
is to be used this endorsement provides additional support 
and justification for accepting the City of Monterey 
proposal. 
It is of final interest to note that DLI was originally 
slated for closure on the 1991 and 1993 BRAC lists. The 
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school was removed from both BRAC lists by the Secretary of 
Defense (Akeman, 1994). The decision to remove DLI was made 
in the final hours prior to submission of the lists to the 
President. It can be reasonably assumed that the decision to 
remove.DLI from the closure list was the result of intensive 
consultant study, lobbying and political gamesmanship. 
E.   SUMMARY 
The City proposal promotes several interesting concepts 
for providing BASEOPS services. There are five specific 
characterisitics that are unique to this proposal: cost 
savings, innovation, risk in implementation, use of 
Government oversight and the percentage of BASEOPS actually 
provided by the City proposal. Cost savings is the most 
prominent of the five attributes, simply because this was 
the overriding reason the BRAC Commission slated DLI for 
closure, excessive cost. As each of these characteristics 
play an integral part within the proposal, they will be used 
as evaluation criteria in the analysis to decide whether or 
not the City Proposal is the best course of action to 
implement in preventing the closure of DLI in the future. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
A.   METHODOLOGY 
In determining whether or not the City of Monterey proposal 
is a viable alternative for BASEOPS functions, it is necessary to 
compare it to other possible methods. Currently, BASEOPS support 
can be provided to DLI via three separate procedures, Fixed-Price 
Contracts, Cost-Reimbursable Contracts, and ISSAs or any 
combination of the three. 
The standard Army decision making or Staff Study process 
will be used to provide a recommendation on whether to accept the 
City of Monterey proposal as offered, reject it or to accept 
another course of action. The Staff Study is a 10 step method 
that uses the following format: 
- Define the Problem (Problem Statement) 
- Provide Background on the problem 
- List facts bearing on the problem 
- List assumptions bearing on the problem 
- Develop Courses of Action (COA) 
- Develop Screening Criteria and Evaluation Criteria 
- Conduct analysis based on the Evaluation Criteria 
- Compare the COA based on the analysis 
- State a conclusion from the analysis and comparison 
- Make a recommendation 
1. Problem Statement 
The problem statement is simply a concise explanation of the 
problem at hand, stated as a task in infinitive or question form. 
The problem statement for this study is: To determine  the best 
method of providing BASEOPS support  to DLI and thus prevent  its 
closure from BRAC 95. 
2. Background 
This area of the Staff Study process provides a lead in to 
the study. It briefly states why the problem exists. For the 
purpose of this research the previous chapters provide sufficient 
background information. 
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3. Facts bearing on the Problem 
These are statements of undeniable truth that can influence 
the problem of its solution. The facts must be correct, 
verifiable and stated clearly. Facts can contain references, 
mathematical formulas or tabular data. The facts bearing on the 
problem are as follows: 
- DLI currently receives BASEOPS support from NPS 
via an ISSA. 
- The cost of BASEOPS support provided by the ISSA 
is $7,617,232. 
- The ISSA covers all BASEOPS support services. 
- The City proposal only covers 45 percent of 
total required BASEOPS services. 
- DLI had been initially chosen by the Army for 
closure and included on the 91 and 93 BRAC lists 
submitted to DOD. 
- DLI was not included on the Army's 95 BRAC list. 
- DLI closure will have a significant economic 
impact on the Monterey County MSA. 
- BRAC Commission stated that DLI Support Costs 
were excessive for the installation size. 
- Current BASEOPS Costs exceed $10 Million. 
- The Army basing strategy requires that the DLI 
mission be relocated to Fort Huachuca, Arizona. 
- Leasing the Presidio of Monterey to the City is 
legal under 10 USC 2 667. 
- Fixed-Price Contracts require less oversight 
than cost-reimbursable contracts. 
- Cost-reimbursable contracts require extensive 
Government oversight. 




In this section it is necessary to identify any assumption 
necessary for a logical discussion of the problem. Assumptions 
are statements that may or may not be true; however available 
data indicate that they are true or may be true some time in the 
future. A valid assumption would be a fact if current data could 
verify it. The assumptions bearing on the problem are as follows: 
- The City of Monterey initiated the proposal to 
prevent the closure of DLI by the BRAC Commission. 
- The City proposal will receive further 
consideration by the Department of the Army than 
is required by law. 
- Cost savings is the major concern of the Army 
and the BRAC Commission. 
- DLI will be at risk in any future BRAC-type 
evaluation if BASEOPS supports costs continue to 
exceed $9 million. 
- By changing the proposal to a real estate 
transaction the City wishes to avoid Government 
oversight. 
- Acceptance of the proposal by DOD will prevent 
future closure of DLI and allow the City to reduce 
the economic impact of Fort Ord's closure. 
- A cost-reimbursable contract could exceed 
$4 million due to MCA project management. 
- Government oversight keeps contract costs under 
control, inherently reduces final contract costs 
and helps control risk. 
- An ISSA may provide the same or greater cost savings 
than the City Proposal. 
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5. Courses of Action (COA) 
These are the alternatives, options or feasible solutions to 
the problem. If a COA is not self-explanatory a brief description 
of what the COA consists of must be provided. The proposed 
courses of action reflect only those options considered by the 
City of Monterey for its proposal (e.g. Firm-Fixed-Price Contract 
or Lease-Lease Back) and those options currently used by DLI for 
BASEOPS services (e.g. Cost-Reimbursable Contracts or ISSAs). 
Different variations of Fixed-Price Contracts such as Fixed-Price 
Incentive Firm or Award Fee will not be evaluated as they were 
not initially or subsequently proposed by the City of Monterey. 
The COA are as follows: 
COA 1 - Accept the City proposal using a Fixed- 
Price Contract. 
COA 2 - Accept the City proposal using a Cost- 
Reimbursable Contract. 
COA 3 - Accept the City proposal using the 
Lease-Lease Back agreement. 
COA 4 - Conduct BASEOPS support under an ISSA 
between NPS and DLI. 
COA 5 - Continue normal BASEOPS support as 
evaluated by the BRAC Commission. 
6. Develop Criteria 
Within this section of the process it is necessary to list 
and describe the criteria used to judge the COA. The criteria 
serve as "yardsticks" against which each COA is measured. The COA 
are not evaluated against each other, they are measured against 
the criteria.  Each of the criteria used must relate to the facts 
and assumptions bearing on the problem. There are two types of 
criteria used in this phase of the process: Screening Criteria 
and Evaluation Criteria. 
Screening Criteria are those standards that a COA must meet 
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to be an acceptable, viable COA. Based solely on this criteria, 
COAs are accepted or rejected. Those accepted are further 
evaluated; those rejected are deleted from consideration. The 
Screening Criterion is as follows: 
Any course of action  that provides  zero cost 
savings as  compared to current DLI BASEOPS costs. 
Application of this screening criteria caused COA 5 to fall out 
of consideration. 
Evaluation Criteria are those standards that are used to 
evaluate, measure and rank order each COA during the analysis and 
comparison phases. It is necessary to use issues that will 
determine the quality of each COA, define how the COA will be 
measured against each criterion and specify the preferred state 
for each criterion. For example, cost may be defined as the total 
cost of an item to include research, development and production 
in dollars. The preferred state being that less or lower cost is 
better. Another example might be: cost is the manufacturer's 
suggested retail price. Again, the preferred state is less or 
lower cost is better or an advantage. Conversely, the higher cost 
would be considered as a disadvantage causing a COA to be 
evaluated low against the criterion. 
Evaluation criteria are normally analyzed in their raw form 
and in a weighted form. The results are then presented in a 
tabular decision matrix. In weighting criteria an explanation is 
provided on how each criterion compares to each of the other 
criterion (e.g. Cost is greater than risk but risk is equal to 
Government oversight). Pursuant to the weighting explanation, 
each criterion is given a numerical value that is then multiplied 
by its raw score to provide its numerical ranking against all 
evaluation criteria. It must also be specified whether the larger 
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numerical total is better or a smaller numerical total is better 
for proper interpretation of the decision matrix. For the purpose 
of this study COAs will be evaluated in a raw and weighted form; 
in both formats the lower numerical score will determine the best 
COA — lower is better. The evaluation criteria are: 
Cost Savings - This is defined as any savings achieved 
from the Government estimated BASEOPS cost of $9,232,852 plus an 
additional $1,000,000 to cover the BASEOPS cost of the POM annex. 
This provides a total BASEOPS cost of $10,232,852 as the base 
cost. The mean cost savings within the four remaining courses of 
action is $1,196,669. The mean cost savings was determined by 
summation of the cost savings of the four remaining COAs 
($4,786,672) and dividing by the number of COAs evaluated (four). 
Any cost savings for BASEOPS that is equal or greater than the 
mean is an advantage. Any total cost savings for BASEOPS below 
the mean is a disadvantage. 
Government Oversight - This is defined as any Defense 
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audit, contract administration 
activities, requirement for cost and pricing data or actual 
Government performance of BASEOPS functions. Government oversight 
is an advantage, little or no Government oversight is a 
disadvantage. Government oversight is considered an advantage 
because of the assumption that it will provide a lower final cost 
and control risk. This criterion is somewhat subjective in 
nature. 
Risk - This is defined as the possibility of not 
meeting expected value, losing value or failing. This criterion 
is subjective in nature. The greater the risk is a disadvantage, 
the lower the risk is an advantage (e.g. the higher the rated 
value the greater the risk and the lower the rated value the 
lower the risk). 
Percentage of Total BASEOPS furnished - This is defined 
as the amount of total BASEOPS functions performed based on the 
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BASEOPS functions listed in Table 6. The mean percentage of 
BASEOPS functions provided among all four courses of action is 
51.25 percent. Any amount equal to or greater than the mean is an 
advantage and any amount less than the mean is a disadvantage. 
Innovation - This is defined as the use of a new 
product, service or method of service that has not been used 
before and promises greater productivity or cost savings. This 
criterion is also subjective in nature. Innovation is an 
advantage, while no innovation, common practice or method is a 
disadvantage. 
7. Analysis 
For each COA the advantages and disadvantages are listed as 
they result from testing each COA against the stated evaluation 
criteria. COAs are not compared in this section. The analysis for 
all four COAs are as follows: 
A. COA 1 - Accept the City proposal using a Fixed- 
Price Contract. 
(1) Advantages: Low Risk. 
(2) Disadvantages: Cost Savings,($861,571) 
Low Oversight, Percentage of BASEOPS provided 
(45%) and No Innovation. 
B. COA 2 - Accept the City proposal using a Cost- 
Reimbursable Contract. 
(1) Advantages: Oversight 
(2) Disadvantages: Cost Savings ($447,910), 
High Risk, Percentage of BASEOPS provided (45%), 
and No Innovation. 
C. COA 3 - Accept the City proposal using the 
Lease-Lease Back agreement. 
(1) Advantages: Innovation. 
(2) Disadvantages: Cost Savings ($861,571), 
Percentage of BASEOPS provided (45%), High Risk, 
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No Oversight. 
D. COA 4 - Conduct BASEOPS support under an ISSA 
between NPS and DLI. 
(1) Advantages: Cost Savings ($2,615,620), 
Oversight, Low Risk, Percentage of BASEOPS 
provided (70%). 
(2) Disadvantages: No Innovation. 
8. Comparison 
In the comparison phase each COA evaluation is compared to 
all other COA evaluations. A narrative comparison, based on 
evaluation criteria is provided and supported by a numerical 
decision matrix. A determination is made, based on the 
comparison, as to which COA best satisfies all criteria and could 
subsequently solve the problem identified in the problem 
statement. The comparison of all four COAs is as follows: 
COA 1 (Fixed-Price Contract) was rated the option with 
the lowest risk as FFP agreements are usually stable and 
enforceable contracts. In cost savings it tied for second with 
COA 3 with a total of $861,571. This assumes that the Army would 
pay the initial $3,586,339 to the City for services under the FFP 
contract and continue to pay contractors $5,784,942 for the 
services not provided by the City Proposal. In the area of 
oversight it was rated third, as the FFP contract would have 
limited contract administration requirements and limited audit 
requirements. However, the submission of cost and pricing data, 
would be required due to the total cost of the contract. The 
percentage of BASEOPS provided was 45 percent and was rated third 
of four, which tied with COA 2 and COA 3. In the area of 
innovation this COA was rated third as FFP contracts are common 
to Government contracting. 
COA 2 (Cost-Reimbursable Contract) was rated third in 
risk as this contract could range in total cost from $2-4 million 
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depending on the number of MCA projects, making actual cost hard 
to determine. In cost savings it came in last with a total 
savings of $447,910. In the area of oversight it was rated 
second. The cost-reimbursable contract requires submission of 
certified cost and pricing data, and extensive DCAA audits and 
contract administration functions. This course of action tied 
with COA 1 and COA 3 in percentage of BASEOPS provided with 45 
percent. In the area of innovation it was rated second due to the 
Government's ability to reward efficiencies in the City's 
management through CPIF or CPAF type contracts. The cost type 
contract can be tailored to meet the changing annual requirements 
for BASEOPS. 
COA 3 (Lease-Lease Back) tied with COA 1 for second in 
cost savings achieving a total savings of $861,571. It was rated 
last or the course of action with the most risk. The risk rating 
is the result of City officials citing numerous details within 
the proposal that have yet to be negotiated. One such example 
cited is how the seniority of additional personnel hired from DLI 
into the City public works division will transfer; second, what 
type of jurisdictional arrangement can be agreed to for police 
patrols, law enforcement, crime prevention and the unique 
security concerns for classified materials at DLI. The Lease- 
Lease Back option was also rated last in oversight. Since this 
would be a real estate transaction rather than a procurement 
transaction, there would be no Government oversight other than 
DLI staff submitting work orders. The real estate transaction 
would void the requirements for submission of cost and pricing 
data, approved estimating systems, DCAA audits, contract 
administration and approval of progress payments. This would give 
the Government little recourse in the event of substandard 
service. However, the Government could withhold rent payments if 
services were determined to be substandard, assuming rent is paid 
on a monthly basis. It tied for third with COA 1 and COA 2 in the 
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percentage of BASEOPS support, by providing 45 percent. However, 
this COA was rated first in innovation. 
COA 4 (ISSA)is the recommended course of action and was 
rated first in cost savings with a total reduction of $2,615,620. 
It was also rated first in oversight as the Navy Public Works 
Department will provide the services. The ISSA was rated as the 
second lowest risk COA among the four, surpassed only by the FFP 
contract. It was rated first in the percentage of BASEOPS 
provided, by furnishing 70 percent of required services. In the 
area of innovation this COA was rated last since the ISSA is a 
common practice within the DOD. 
Table 11 provides the numerical evaluation in support of the 
comparison'section. For example, in the area of cost savings COA 
4 was rated first and received a numerical rating of one, whereas 
COA 1 and COA 3 tied and received numerical ratings of 2.5. COA 2 
was rated last in cost savings and was provided a numerical value 
of four. The smaller numerical value represents the COA that best 
satisfies the criteria — lower is better. 
Criteria COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 COA 4 
Cost Savings 2.5 4 2.5 1 
Percentage of BASEOPS 3 3 3 1 
Oversight 3 2 4 1 
Innovation 3 2 1 4 
Risk 1 3 4 2 
TOTAL 12.5 14 14.5 9 
Table 11. Relative Value Decision Matrix 
9. Weighted Evaluation 
To expand the analysis of the problem statement and validate 
the outcome of the raw data decision matrix the evaluation 
criteria were weighted in the following manner. 
- Cost Savings is greater than Percentage of BASEOPS 
services provided 
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- Cost Savings is greater than Government oversight, risk 
and innovation 
- Percentage of BASEOPS services provided is greater than 
Government oversight, risk and innovation 
- Government Oversight is greater than Risk and innovation 
- Innovation is greater than Risk 
Cost Savings is the most important of the evaluation 
criteria. Cost was the primary reason the BRAC Commission 
recommended the closure of DLL Cost control has become the 
primary factor in defense downsizing in the current era of 
constrained budget appropriations and a reduced budget for the 
DOD. 
Percentage of BASEOPS services provided is the second most 
important evaluation criterion. For each COA the percentage of 
services provided is an indirect result of cost savings. 
Regardless of cost savings in a COA, if only 50 percent of 
services are provided as a result of the savings, the cost to the 
Government to provide the remaining services would offset any 
initial operating budget reduction. 
Government oversight is rated third in importance. Oversight 
can help attain projected cost savings through audits, submission 
of cost and pricing data, contract administration and involvement 
of Government officials in administration of the actual work. 
Risk is also mitigated with Government oversight as problems may 
be foreseen prior to their occurrence and solutions can be 
implemented before unexpected incidents become unmanageable. 
Innovation is the fourth most important criteria. Although 
innovation in a COA can be advantageous and can provide 
significant cost savings, certain innovations may be 
operationally impossible. Additionally, current legislation may 
make any revolutionary proposal which could solve the problem, 
illegal. This could be a more important criterion should 
legislation be changed in the future. 
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Risk is the lowest rated criterion. This is the least 
important concern. Risk can usually be controlled and monitored 
within BASEOPS support contracts. Simply put services are either 
provided at a defined level or they are not provided at a defined 
level. 
Table 12 provides the numerical evaluation based on the 
weighting of the criteria. The numerical weight which is in 
parenthesis is listed next to the criterion. The value for each 
criterion in each COA is determined by multiplying the weighted 
value of the criterion (in parenthesis) by the original numerical 
value given in Table 11. For example, in Table 11, COA 1 received 
a rating of 2.5. This rating is now multiplied by two, the 
weighting factor for cost savings, resulting in a weighted value 
for cost savings for COA 1, in Table 12, of five. Again, the 
lower numerical value represents the COA that best satisfies the 
criteria — lower is better. 
Criteria COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 COA 4 
Cost Savings (2) 5 8 5 2 
Percentage of BASEOPS (3) 9 9 9 3 
Oversight (4) 12 8 16 4 
Innovation (5) 15 10 5 20 
Risk (6) 6 18 24 12 
TOTAL 47 53 59 41 
Table 12. Weighted Value Decision Matrix 
The weighted value analysis provides the same results as the 
relative value analysis. COA 4, with a weighted value of 41, best 
satisfies the evaluation criteria. A sensitivity analysis was 
conducted using the Military Application Program Package (MAPP) 
statistical software. The sensitivity test is used to determine 
if the weighted values given to each criterion cause any one 
criterion to statistically invalidate the decision matrix. 
74 
A sensitivity rating of 90 percent or higher, using the MAPP 
program, defines each criterion as non-sensitive to any other 
criterion.  A sensitivity rating of 93.4 percent was calculated 
using the weighting values in Table 12. 
To further validate the evaluation, the weighting scheme was 
adjusted so that each criterion was weighted as the most 
important factor. For example, in Table 13, percentage of BASEOPS 
is weighted as the most important criterion instead of cost 
savings. The remainder of the weighted values remain the same to 
insure the sensitivity rating of the complete matrix. In the 
terms of a scientific test the base data listed in Table 11 
remains constant, but the weighting value or catalyst has changed 
in each subsequent table. 
Criteria COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 COA 4 
Cost Savings (6) 15 24 15 6 
Percentage of BASEOPS (2) 6 6 8 2 
Oversight (3) 9 6 12 3 
Innovation (4) 12 8 4 16 
Risk (5) 5 15 20 10 
TOTAL 47 59 59 37 
Table 13. Weighted Value Decision Matrix (Percentage of BASEOPS 
Most Important Criterion) 
Criteria COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 COA 4 
Cost Savings (5) 12.5 20 12.5 5 
Percentage of BASEOPS (6) 18 18 18 6 
Oversight (2) 6 4 8 2 
Innovation (3) 9 6 3 12 
Risk (4) 4 12 16 8 
TOTAL 49.5 60 57.5 33 
Table 14. Weighted Value Decision Matrix (Oversight as Most 
Important Criterion) 
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Criteria COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 COA 4 
Cost Savings (4) 10 16 10 4 
Percentage of BASEOPS (5) 15 15 15 5 
Oversight (6) 18 12 24 6 
Innovation (2) 6 4 2 8 
Risk (3) 3 9 13 6 
TOTAL 52 56 64 29 
Table 15. Weiahted Value Dec. ision Ma trix (] Innovation as Mc 
Important Criterion) 
Criteria COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 COA 4 
Cost Savings (3) 7.5 12 7.5 3 
Percentage of BASEOPS (4) 12 12 12 4 
Oversight (5) 15 10 20 5 
Innovation (6) 18 12 6 24 
Risk (2) 2 6 8 4 
TOTAL 54.5 52 53.5 40 
Table 16. Weighted Value Decision Matrix (Risk as Most Important 
Criterion) 
In each of the weighted decision matrices, COA 4 achieves the 
lowest value regardless of the weighted value changes. These 
results further validate, the choice of evaluation criteria, the 
initial weighting scheme and the recommended solution. 
B.   CONCLUSION 
COA 4 conducting BASEOPS support under an ISSA between NPS 
and DLI is the best way to provide support to DLI and prevent its 
future closure. This alternative provided the greatest cost 
savings with a total reduction of $2,615,620. The oversight 
provided by the Navy Public Works department will insure that the 
projected cost savings are realized. It was also rated first in 
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oversight as the Navy Public Works Department will actually 
provide or contract for the services. The ISSA was rated as the 
second lowest risk COA among the four, surpassed only by the FFP 
contract. It was rated first in the percentage of BASEOPS 
provided, by furnishing 70 percent of required services, thus 
reducing the Government's cost to provide the remainder of needed 






It is apparent that the BRAC process has dramatically 
affected the Monterey County area. The possible closure of DLI 
and eventually NPS would devastate the local economy. The City of 
Monterey Proposal has merit and is a unique solution to DLI's 
BASEOPS problem. The idea that a local municipality could provide 
standard public works services to an installation, depot or 
national guard armory at cost is one that can be copied by cities 
in similar situations. However, the Monterey proposal falls short 
in many areas. It is clear that greater economies of scale and 
cost savings can be achieved through ISSAs between the NPS and 
DLI. The ISSA will reduce DLI support costs and should prevent 
closure of DLI in future BRAC type evaluations. If the City of 
Monterey is interested in pursuing the proposal, they should 
expand their proposal to provide 100 percent of BASEOPS services 
to both NPS and DLI. 
B. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What does the City of Monterey Proposal  offer to  the 
Department  of Defense in  cost  savings for operating and 
maintaining the Presidio  of Monterey and the Defense Language 
Institute? 
The proposal offers the DOD approximately $.9 to 1.0 million 
in cost savings for the operation and maintenance of DLI at the 
POM and the POM Annex at the old Fort Ord installation. 
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2. What is  the current budget  allocated for  the  operation  of 
the Presidio of Monterey and the Defense Language Institute? 
Approximately $10.5 million was allocated for BASEOPS 
support services prior to the BRAC 93 evaluation of DLL It was 
this high cost for support services coupled with other 
inefficiencies that placed DLI at risk of closure. 
3. Why are  the Presidio of Monterey and the Defense Language 
Institute at risk from the Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission? 
DLI was at risk due to high BASEOPS support costs for an 
installation of its size. Additionally, the high cost of living 
in the Monterey County MSA was cited by the Commission as another 
prime reason to close DLI, move its mission to Fort Huachuca and 
contract with a state university for language training. 
4. What  are  the  current  costs incurred by the Presidio of 
Monterey and the Defense Language Institute? 
As of 4 May 1995 BASEOPS support costs for DLI are estimated 
at $7.6 million. 
5. Who provided base support  operations for POM and DLI 
prior  to  the BRAC evaluation? 
DLI received BASEOPS support functions from Fort Ord and 
Forces Command via a memorandum of agreement. However, when Fort 
Ord was designated for closure by the BRAC, DLI was forced to 
contract out services with civilian contractors. 
6. Are  there qualities  of the City of Monterey that provide 
DLI a  unique  environment in  which  to  operate? 
The City of Monterey is the home of the Monterey Institute 
for International Studies, The Naval Postgraduate School, The 
Monterey College of Law and California State University at 
Monterey Bay. The Institute for International Studies and the 
College of Law routinely collaborate with DLI faculty on numerous 
international relations and legal issues. It is anticipated that 
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the California State University will engage in similar 
cooperative research and study once the University is 
operational. 
7. What  economies  of scale/economies  can  the City of 
Monterey provide  to  cut  the  cost  of operating POM and DLI? 
Economies of scale are defined as the reduction of the costs 
of producing a good or service due to increasing the size of the 
producing entity and the share of the total market for the good 
or service produced. The City intends to increase the land area 
which it maintains by adding the land which constitutes the POM 
to existing City Public Works responsibilities. This will be done 
with only minor increases in the City Public Works and 
administration staff. This action will reduce the cost per square 
foot of maintaining land as existing resources are now 
distributed over larger quantities of land. 
8. Does  the proposal provide either DOD or  the City of 
Monterey additional  revenues  to  offset  costs?    If so,  how will 
the revenue be  used? 
The proposal does not, by design, provide profit for the 
City of Monterey. However, due to the nature of BASEOPS support 
services and MCA construction projects, it is possible that 
excess funds would remain unused at the end of the fiscal year. 
It is the intention of the City to return any money, to DOD, that 
is in excess of what it costs the City to provide the services'. 
The City Council definitively stated that the City of Monterey 
would enter into this agreement without profit or detriment to 
the City. 
9. What   type  of leasing agreements and contracts  could be 
used as part  of this proposal? 
The Assistant City manager insists that the lease will be a 
standard real estate lease transaction. However, it must be noted 
that several special situations must be negotiated between lessor 
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and lessee prior to completion of the lease as noted in Chapter 
IV. Consequently, the lease may start as a standard real estate 
transaction but will be significantly altered and customized by 
the City and DOD. In particular DOD always reserves the right to 
terminate any agreement for convenience, therefore a provision 
for that eventuality would probably be inserted into the lease. 
Termination could prove costly for DOD and the City. 
10.   What  type of pricing strategy will   the City of Monterey 
use in contracting to provide services  to POM and DLI? 
The City intends to use incremental pricing. This method 
involves dropping all fixed costs involved with providing BASEOPS 
services and charging only those variable costs and material 
costs incurred in providing the services. An example of this 
strategy is explained in Chapter four, Section B.3. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
The City of Monterey proposal provides a unique idea in 
installation administration. However, the proposal was riddled 
with generalities and areas that were designed to be negotiated 
prior to acceptance. Areas for further study would include: 
developing a cost analysis of assuming 100 percent of BASEOPS for 
DLI and NPS; developing a process flow for requesting major 
repair and maintenance of facilities and housing units; 
recommending levels of additional Government oversight if a lease 
agreement were approved; and finally, applying this type of 
proposal to another similar installation in a different city or 
town. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Although the City's proposal is unique, it fails to provide 
the necessary amount of BASEOPS services required at DLI. The use 
of an ISSA between NPS and DLI provides the largest percentage of 
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services at the greatest cost savings. This combination, services 
and cost, was the prime reason the BRAC Commission recommended 
DLI for closure. The conduct of this study has proven that the 
use of an ISSA with NPS would eliminate the excessive cost of 
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